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Abstract
We describe an integrated approach to vagueness and uncertainty within a propo-
sitional logic setting and based on a combination of three valued logic and probability.
Three valued valuations are employed in order to model explicitly borderline cases and
in this context we give an axiomatic characterisation of two well known three valued
models; supervaluations and Kleene valuations. We then demonstrate the close rela-
tionship between Kleene valuations and a sub-class of supervaluations. Belief pairs
are lower and upper measures on the sentences of the language generated from a prob-
ability distribution deﬁned over a ﬁnite set of three valued valuations. We describe
links between these measures and other uncertainty theories and we show the close
relationship between Kleene belief pairs and a sub-class of supervaluation belief pairs.
Finally, a probabilistic approach to conditioning is explored within this framework.
1 Introduction
There is a highly interconnected relationship between vagueness and uncertainty. It is
not just that vagueness occurs in conjunction with epistemic uncertainty but also that
linguistic uncertainty is integral to vague propositions themselves. The latter refers to
uncertainty about the deﬁnition or interpretation of concepts in natural language and is
a natural result of the empirical manner in which language is learnt. Lawry [13] and Las-
siter [12] argue that this form of uncertainty is epistemic in nature and can be modelled
probabilistically. In this case, the blurred boundary of a vague category can be modelled
by probability deﬁned over possible precise boundaries. There is nonetheless an impor-
tant distinction between blurred boundaries and the explicit identiﬁcation of borderline
cases. Indeed the latter does not refer to epistemic uncertainty at all but instead results
from a non-Boolean truth model. For example, given an exact value for Ethel’s height it
might be certain that she is borderline short. Vagueness is not only the result of linguistic
1
uncertainty or of borderline cases but comprises of at least both of these features. Fur-
thermore, vague predicates are everywhere embedded in our statements and beliefs about
the world. Consequently, to assess such beliefs we must consider vagueness in conjunc-
tion with epistemic uncertainty about the state of the world. This requires an integrated
approach capturing both uncertainty about the world and linguistic uncertainty about
the conventions of language, together with non-Boolean truth models resulting from more
ﬂexible category representation.
In this paper we investigate these ideas in a propositional logic setting by combining
probability and three valued valuations i.e. taking truth values true, borderline or false.
Initially, we adopt an axiomatic approach and consider what properties should be satisﬁed
by three valued valuations if they are to appropriately represent explicitly borderline cases,
and following on from this we then investigate the relationship between two diﬀerent
types of valuations. More speciﬁcally, we show that there is a strong relationship between
Kleene valuations and a sub-type of supervaluations over a restricted set of formulae of the
language. As a means of combining epistemic uncertainty and explicitly borderline cases
we will introduce belief pairs in the form of lower and upper measures on the sentences of
the language. These are generated from probability distributions deﬁned over three valued
valuations. More formally, the lower measure of a sentence will be taken as corresponding
to the probability that it is true, and the upper measure as corresponding to the probability
that it is not false. We introduce diﬀerent types of belief pairs based on diﬀerent underlying
three valued truth models, and we investigate some of the relationships between them.
We then extend these ideas so as to consider conditional beliefs based on probabilistic
conditioning over three valued truth models.
An overview of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we introduce a generic deﬁnition
of three valued valuation in a propositional logic setting and give Kleene valuations and
supervaluations as distinct examples. Section 3 proposes a number of axiomatic properties
which we might require a suitable three valued valuation model to satisfy. We discuss the
reasonableness of these properties and provide characterisations of both Kleene valuations
and supervaluations. The notion of a vagueness ordering of valuations is discussed in sec-
tion 4 and a candidate partial ordering is proposed. These ideas are then used as the basis
of an argument against  Lukasiewicz valuations as a model of borderline cases. Belief pairs
are introduced in section 6 where we exploit the results in section 5 in order to demon-
strate the relationship between Kleene and supervaluation belief pairs. Furthermore, we
consider the special case in which uncertainty only concerns the level of vagueness of the
language. In section 7 we then outline a model of conditional belief within our proposed
framework. Finally, in section 8 we give some discussion and conclusions.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: Firstly we give axiomatic charac-
terisations of both supervaluations and Kleene valuations as special cases of a very general
class of three valued truth functions. This helps to make explicit the assumptions about
the behaviour of borderline cases which is implicit in each case. Secondly, we clarify the
relationship between Kleene valuations and a sub-class of supervaluations called complete
bounded supervaluations. It is shown that these two types of valuations are equal on
the subset of sentences in negated normal form which do not involve both a proposi-
tional variable and its negation. Consequently, we have identiﬁed a functional class of
supervaluations1, which are similar to Kleene valuations but which preserve classical logic
equivalences and tautologies. Thirdly, we extend these results to belief pairs consisting of
lower and upper belief measures generated from a probability distribution deﬁned over a
ﬁnite set of three valued valuations. More speciﬁcally, we show that complete bounded
supervaluation belief pairs coincide with Kleene belief pairs for the same class of sentences
described above. Finally, we investigate conditional belief pairs as generated by condi-
tional probabilities deﬁned over a ﬁnite set of three valued valuations. This is rather a
novel approach to conditioning for non-classical logic, and is quite distinct from the more
usual implication operators deﬁned for many valued logics. We prove a number of results
for conditional supervaluation and Kleene belief pairs under diﬀerent assumptions. In
some cases the work presented extends results and employs deﬁnitions which have already
appeared in the literature including in [14], [15], [16] and [17]. Throughout the paper we
will, where appropriate, note the nature and scope of this extension.
2 Three Valued Valuations
In this section we propose a general deﬁnition for a three valued valuation of a proposi-
tional logic language and give two important examples as well as introducing some useful
notation. Let L be a language of propositional logic with connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬ and
propositional variables P = {p1, . . . , pn}. Let SL denote the sentences of L as generated
recursively from the propositional variables by application of the three connectives. Fur-
thermore, let LL = P ∪ {¬pi : pi ∈ P} denote the literals of L. The general deﬁnition of
a three valued valuation on L is then given as follows:
Definition 1. Three Valued Valuation [15]: A three valued valuation on L is a function
v : SL → {1, 12 , 0} such that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL if v(θ) ∈ {0, 1} and v(ϕ) ∈ {0, 1} then v(¬θ) =
1 − v(θ), v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ),v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ),v(ϕ)). Here the truth
values denote absolutely true (1), borderline (12) and absolutely false (0) respectively. The
restriction on v is that it should obey the same rules as Tarski valuations2 in the case of
Boolean expressions.
1Although supervaluations are never truth-function they can be functional in a weaker sense. More
details are given later in the paper.
2We use the term Tarski valuations to refer to classical Boolean valuations v : SL → {0, 1} deﬁned
recursively by the following combination rules for the connectives ∀θ,ϕ ∈ SL; v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ), v(θ∧ϕ) =
min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
¬ 1 0
1
2
1
2
0 1
∧ 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
1
2
1
2
1
2 0
0 0 0 0
∨ 1 12 0
1 1 1 1
1
2 1
1
2
1
2
0 1 12 0
Table 1: Kleene truth tables
Deﬁnition 1 a very broad class of valuations with three truth values in which the
only requirement is that they remain consistent with Tarski valuations in the case of
sentences with binary truth values. Two well known examples of valuations of this form
are supervaluations and Kleene valuations:
Definition 2. Supervaluations [7]: Let T denote the set of Tarski (classical) valuations
deﬁned on L. A supervaluation is a three valued valuation deﬁned by a set Π ⊆ T of Tarski
valuations corresponding to admissible precisiﬁcations, such that ∀θ ∈ SL;
v(θ) =


1 : min{v(θ) : v ∈ Π} = 1
0 : max{v(θ) : v ∈ Π} = 0
1
2 : otherwise
Definition 3. Kleene valuations [10]: A Kleene valuation is a three valued valuation
deﬁned recursively such that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL; v(¬θ) = 1 − v(θ),v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ),v(ϕ))
and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ),v(ϕ)). The truth tables summarizing these combination rules
are shown in table 1.
Notice that unlike supervaluations, Kleene valuations are fully truth functional, mean-
ing that not only can the truth value of all sentences in SL be derived from the truth values
of P, but also that this mapping is based on ﬁxed combination functions for each of the
connectives. Supervaluations can never be truth functional although, in section 3, we in-
troduce a sub-type of supervaluations which while not fully truth functional are functional
in the weaker sense that all truth values can be derived from those of the propositional
variables.
Given a three valued valuation v, for notational convenience, we also introduce asso-
ciated lower and upper valuations as follows:
Definition 4. Lower and Upper Valuations: Let v be a three valued valuation on L
then we deﬁne an associated pair of lower and upper valuations on L as follows: Let
v, v : SL → {0, 1} such that ∀θ ∈ SL,
v(θ) =
{
1 : v(θ) = 1
0 : v(θ) 6= 1
and v(θ) =
{
1 : v(θ) 6= 0
0 : v(θ) = 0
In other words, v(θ) = 1 if and only if θ is true, while v(θ) = 1 if and only if θ is not
false.
Notice that the underlying three valued valuation can be retrieved from the associated
lower and upper valuations according to: ∀θ ∈ SL;
v(θ) =
v(θ) + v(θ)
2
Indeed the pair of valuations ~v = (v, v) provides an alternative characterisation of v as
follows: ∀θ ∈ SL;
v(θ) = 1 if and only if ~v(θ) = (1, 1)
v(θ) =
1
2
if and only if ~v(θ) = (0, 1)
v(θ) = 0 if and only if ~v(θ) = (0, 0)
For supervaluations the lower and upper valuations are given by: ∀θ ∈ SL;
v(θ) = min{v(θ) : v ∈ Π} and v(θ) = max{v(θ) : v ∈ Π}
Notice that lower and upper supervaluations are formally equivalent to Boolean necessity
and possibility measures on SL [4]. Despite this formal identity there is none-the-less a
subtle diﬀerence in interpretation between the two models according to which possibility
theory treats the third truth value as meaning unknown rather than borderline. See [1]
for an in depth discussion of these issues.
For Kleene valuations the lower and upper valuations can be determined recursively
according to the following combination rules for the connectives: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL;
• v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ) and v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ).
• v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
• v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
Throughout the remainder of this paper we will use three valued notation (deﬁni-
tion 1) and lower and upper valuations (deﬁnition 4) interchangeably according to the
relationships identiﬁed above.
3 Axioms for Three Valued Valuations
We now introduce a number of axiomatic principles which we might require three valued
valuations to satisfy if they are to capture the notion of explicitly borderline cases. As
mentioned above, in this paper we do not intend that the middle truth value should
represent epistemic uncertainty about the state of the world, but rather that it is due
to inherently borderline cases arising as a result of the inherent underlying ﬂexibility of
the underlying language [1]. In other words, a truth value of 12 does not represent an
uncertain epistemic state. To illustrate this distinction consider a simple non-Boolean
model in which predicates have two distinct boundaries. For example, the predicate short
could be deﬁned using lower and upper height thresholds h ≤ h, according to which a
height h is classiﬁed as being absolutely short if h ≤ h and absolutely not short if h > h.
Intermediate height values where h < h ≤ h are then classiﬁed as being borderline short.
In particular, if we knew that Ethel’s height lay in this range then there would be no
relevant epistemic uncertainty and we would be certain that Ethel was borderline short.
The diﬀerence between using the middle truth value to represent borderline and using it
to represent uncertainty is discussed in detail in [5] and [1]. For this paper we will consider
the axioms proposed below in the context in which we interpret the middle truth value as
modelling explicitly borderline cases and not epistemic states.
We now adopt this axiomatic approach so as to characterise both supervaluations and
Kleene valuations in terms of intuitive properties satisﬁed by three valued valuations.
Initially, we show that supervaluations are characterised by the following three axioms:
∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL;
• P1 Duality: v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ) 3.
• P2 Tautology: If |= θ then v(θ) = 1.
• P3 Equivalence: If θ ≡ ϕ then v(θ) = v(ϕ).
where |= and ≡ refer to the classical (Tarski) entailment and equivalence relations respec-
tively. Given deﬁnition 1 P1 simply requires that the negation of a borderline case is also
a borderline case. This then seems perhaps the least controversial of all the axioms we con-
sider. P2 and P3 require respectively that classical (Tarski) tautologies and equivalences
are preserved by three valued valuations.
Theorem 5. Let v be a three valued valuation of L, then v satisﬁes P1, P2 and P3 if
and only if v is a supervaluation.
Proof. (⇐) trivial
(⇒) By the disjunctive normal form theorem of propositional logic and P3 it follows that
there exists functions f : 2T → {0, 1} and f : 2T → {0, 1} such that: ∀θ ∈ SL,
v(θ) = f({v ∈ T : v(θ) = 1}) and v(θ) = f({v ∈ T : v(θ) = 1})
By P1 it follows that ∀A ⊆ T,
f(A) = 1− f(Ac) (1)
3Notice that given P1 then the lower and upper valuations are dual so that ∀θ ∈ SL; v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ)
and v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ).
Now by deﬁnition 4 we have that v ≤ v. This holds if and only if ∀A ⊆ T, f(A) ≤ f(A)
and by equation 1 this holds if and only if ∀A ⊆ T
f(A) + f(Ac) ≤ 1 (2)
From equation 2 it follows that ∀A ⊆ T, f(A) ⇒ f(Ac) = 0. Now by P2 we have that
f(T) = 1 and hence by equations 1 and 2 it follows that
f(∅) = 0 and f(T) = 1, f(∅) = 0 (3)
Now by deﬁnition 1 three valued valuations must agree with classical valuations for crisp
sentences. Hence, by deﬁnition 4 we have that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, v(θ) = 1, v(ϕ) = 1⇒ v(θ∧ϕ) =
1. Therefore,
∀A,B ⊆ T, f(A ∩B) ≥ min(f(A), f(B)) (4)
Also, v(θ) = 1 or v(ϕ) = 1⇒ v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 and therefore
∀A,B ⊆ T, f(A ∪B) ≥ max(f(A), f(B)) (5)
We can now show that f is an increasing function in the sense that if A ⊆ B ⊆ T then
f(A) ≤ f(B): Suppose A ⊆ B and f(A) = 1 then since A ∪B = B it follows by equation
5 that f(B) ≥ 1⇒ f(B) = 1. It also follows that f is increasing in same sense. Suppose
again that A ⊆ B and that f(A) = 1 then by equation 1 1− f(Ac) = 1⇒ f(Ac) = 0 since
f is increasing4. Therefore 1− f(Bc) = 1⇒ f(B) = 1.
We can now use the fact that f is increasing together with equations 3 and 4 to show
that f is a Boolean possibility measure [4]. This is a well known result but we include
the details for completeness. Suppose ∃A,B ⊆ T such that f(A ∩B) > min(f(A), f (B)).
This would imply that f(A ∩B) = 1 and min(f(A), f (B)) = 0. However, A ∩B ⊆ A and
A ∩B ⊆ B. Hence, since f is an increasing function, then f(A ∩B) = 1⇒ f(A) = 1 and
f(B) = 1 which is a contradiction. Therefore,
∀A,B ⊆ T, f(A ∩B) ≤ min(f(A), f(B))
Hence, by equation 4 it holds that
∀A,B ⊆ T, f(A ∩B) = min(f(A), f(B)) (6)
Furthermore, by equation 1 it follows that:
f(A ∪B) = 1− f(Ac ∩Bc) = 1−min(f(Ac), f(Bc)) by equation 6
= 1−min(1− f(A), 1 − f(B)) = max(f(A), f(B)) by equation 1
4Suppose f(Bc) = 1⇒ f(Ac) = 1 (since Bc ⊆ Ac) which is a contradiction.
Therefore, f and f are Boolean necessity and possibility measures on 2T respectively.
From this it follows that [4], ∀θ ∈ SL;
v(θ) = min{v(θ) : v ∈ Π} and v(θ) = min{v(θ) : v ∈ Π} where Π = {v ∈ T : f({v}) = 1}
as required.
There is a slight variant of this characterisation based on the following property:
• P4 Non-Vacuous: ∃θ ∈ SL such that v(θ) 6= 12 .
Corollary 6. A three valued valuation v on L satisﬁes P1, P3 and P4 if and only if v
is a supervaluation.
Proof. (⇐) Trivial. (⇒) We show that if v satisﬁes P1, P3 and P4 then v also satisﬁes
P2. In the proof of theorem 5 we showed using properties P1 and P3 only together with
deﬁnition 1 that, ∀θ ∈ SL, v(θ) = f({v ∈ T : v(θ) = 1}) and v(θ) = f({v ∈ T : v(θ) = 1})
where both f and f are increasing functions. By P4 we assume w.l.o.g. that ∃θ ∈ SL
such that v(θ) = 1. Let A = {v ∈ T : v(θ) = 1} then f(A) = f(A) = 1. Therefore, since
A ⊆ T and since both f and f are increasing it follows that f(T) = f(T) = 1. Hence, P2
holds. The result then follows trivially from theorem 5.
These results improve on a characterisation result for supervaluations given in [15] which
required the additional axiom that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
Theorem 5 would initially seem to provide the basis of a strong case for adopting
supervaluations as a three valued truth model, at least in a simple propositional logic
setting. This would certainly be true if we were to interpret the middle truth value
as resulting from uncertainty about an underlying Tarski truth model. Given such an
interpretation then there would be a very strong case for preserving classical equivalences
and tautologies. For instance, suppose that v(θ) = 12 were simply to mean that the Boolean
truth value of θ is unknown. In this case θ could not be a classical tautology since it would
be known to be true in all Tarski valuations, hence removing all uncertainty. Also, since
any two classically equivalent sentences have the same truth value for all Tarski valuations
then there could only be uncertainty about one if there was also the same uncertainty about
the other. Indeed as mentioned earlier, Boolean possibility theory provides an alternative
epistemic interpretation of supervaluations consistent with exactly such a view. However,
since here we are using the third truth value to represent explicitly borderline cases then
the situation is much less clear cut. From this perspective the three truth values are
primitives resulting from an inherently non-Boolean interpretation of the language, and
consequently whether or not classical tautologies and equivalences are preserved is an open
question. On the other hand, it is not clear why simply allowing for borderline cases in the
language should, in itself, result in P2 or P3 being violated. Hence, we might then argue
that, in the absence of good reasons to the contrary, we should preserve Tarski tautologies
and equivalences as we move from a two to a three valued setting.
We now introduce four additional axioms which when taken together with P1 provide
a characterisation of Kleene valuations: ∀θ, ϕ, ψ ∈ SL;
• P5 Commutativity: v(θ ∧ ϕ) = v(ϕ ∧ θ) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = v(ϕ ∨ θ).
• P6 Bounds: If v(θ) 6= 1 or v(ϕ) 6= 1 then v(θ∧ϕ) 6= 1, and if v(θ) 6= 0 or v(ϕ) 6= 0
then v(θ ∨ ϕ) 6= 0. 5
• P7 Monotonicity: If v(ψ) < v(ϕ) then v(θ∧ψ) ≤ v(θ∧ϕ) and v(θ∨ψ) ≤ v(θ∨ϕ).
• P8 Borderline: If v(θ) = v(ϕ) = 12 then v(θ ∧ ϕ) = v(θ ∨ ϕ) =
1
2 .
Lemma 7. Let v be a three valued valuation on L satisfying P5, P6 and P7 then ∀θ, ϕ ∈
SL;
v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∧ ϕ) ≤ min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
and
v(θ ∨ ϕ) ≥ max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
Proof. By deﬁnition 1 it follows that if v(θ) = v(ϕ) = 1 then v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1. In other
words, if v(θ) = v(ϕ) = 1 then v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)). In all other cases,
we have that either v(θ) 6= 1 or v(ϕ) 6= 1 and hence by P6 v(θ ∧ ϕ) 6= 1. Therefore,
v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 0 = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) as required.
Suppose that v(θ ∧ ϕ) > min(v(θ), v(ϕ)). This implies that v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 and
min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) = 0 i.e. that either v(θ) = 0 or v(ϕ) = 0. Now w.l.o.g. by P5 we
can assume that v(θ) = 0. If v(ϕ) = 1 then by deﬁnition 1 v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 0. Otherwise,
v(ϕ) ∈ {0, 12}. In this case can assume that there exists ψ ∈ SL such that v(ψ) = 1
6
so that by deﬁnition 1 v(θ ∧ ψ) = 0, and hence by P7 v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 0. Hence, in all cases
v(θ ∧ϕ) = 0. This is a contradiction and therefore v(θ ∧ϕ) ≤ min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) as required.
Also, by deﬁnition 1 it follows that if v(θ) = 0 and v(ϕ) = 0 then v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 0. In
other words, if v(θ) = v(ϕ) = 0 then v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 0 = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)). In all other cases,
we have that either v(θ) 6= 0 or v(ϕ) 6= 0 and hence by P6 v(θ ∨ ϕ) 6= 0. Therefore
v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) as required.
5The name bounds for this property is motivated by the fact that when translated into lower and upper
valuation notation it requires that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, v(θ ∧ ϕ) ≤ min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) ≥ max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
6Otherwise ∀θ ∈ SL, v(θ) = 1
2
which trivially implies that v is a Kleene valuation and immediately
satisﬁes the required inequality.
Suppose that v(θ ∨ ϕ) < max(v(θ), v(ϕ)). This implies that v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 0 and
max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) = 1 i.e. that either v(θ) = 1 or v(ϕ) = 1. Now w.l.o.g. by P5 we
can assume that v(θ) = 1. If v(ϕ) = 0 then by deﬁnition 1 v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1. Otherwise,
v(ϕ) ∈ {12 , 1}. In this case we can assume that there exists ψ ∈ SL such that v(ψ) = 0
so that by deﬁnition 1 v(θ ∨ ψ) = 1, and hence by P7 v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1. Hence, in all cases
v(θ∨ϕ) = 1. This is a contradiction and therefore v(θ∨ϕ) ≥ max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) as required.
Theorem 8. Let v be a three valued valuation on L, then v satisﬁes P1, P5, P6, P7
and P8 if and only if v is a Kleene valuation.
Proof. (⇐) It is trivial to show that Kleene valuations satisfy all of P1, P5, P6, P7 and
P8.
(⇒) Given P1 and by lemma 7 it is only required to show that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, v(θ ∧ ϕ) =
min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
Suppose v(θ ∧ϕ) < min(v(θ), v(ϕ)). In this case v(θ ∧ϕ) = 0 and min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) = 1
i.e. v(θ) ∈ {12 , 1} and v(ϕ) ∈ {
1
2 , 1}. Now if v(θ) =
1
2 and v(ϕ) =
1
2 then by P8
v(θ∧ϕ) = 12 in which case v(θ∧ϕ) = 1 which is a contradiction. Furthermore, if v(θ) = 1
and v(ϕ) = 1 then by deﬁnition 1 v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 in which case v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 which is a
contradiction. Hence, by P5 we need now only consider the case in which v(θ) = 12 and
v(ϕ) = 1. Now by P8 v(θ ∧ θ) = 12 and hence by P7 v(θ ∧ϕ) ∈ {
1
2 , 1}. This implies that
v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 which is a contradiction. Hence, v(θ ∧ ϕ) 6< min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and by lemma 7
v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
Suppose v(θ∨ϕ) > max(v(θ), v(ϕ)). In this case v(θ∨ϕ) = 1 and max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) = 0
i.e. v(θ) ∈ {0, 12} and v(ϕ) ∈ {0,
1
2}. Now if v(θ) =
1
2 and v(ϕ) =
1
2 then by P8
v(θ∨ϕ) = 12 in which case v(θ∨ϕ) = 0 which is a contradiction. Furthermore, if v(θ) = 0
and v(ϕ) = 0 then by deﬁnition 1 v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 0 in which case v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 0 which is a
contradiction. Hence, by P5 we need now only consider the case in which v(θ) = 12 and
v(ϕ) = 0. Now by P8 v(θ ∨ θ) = 12 and hence by P7 v(θ ∨ϕ) ∈ {0,
1
2}. This implies that
v(θ ∨ϕ) = 0 which is a contradiction. Hence, v(θ ∨ϕ) 6> max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and by lemma 7
v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
Theorem 9. Supervaluations satisfy P5, P6 and P7.
Proof. P5 follows trivially from the commutativity of Tarski valuations. Now given P5
let v be a supervaluation then suppose that v(θ) 6= 1 then ∃v ∈ Π such that v(θ) = 0 ⇒
v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 0 and hence v(θ ∧ ϕ) 6= 1. Also, suppose v(θ) 6= 0 then ∃v ∈ Π such that
v(θ) = 1⇒ v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 and hence v(θ ∨ ϕ) 6= 0. Hence, P6 holds.
For P7 we must consider only the following cases (assuming P5)
• v(θ) = 1,v(ϕ) = 1: In this case v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 ≥ v(θ ∧ ψ) for any ψ.
• v(θ) = 1,v(ϕ) = 12 : In this case v(θ ∧ ϕ) =
1
2 . If v(ψ) = 0 then v(θ ∧ ψ) = 0 <
v(θ ∧ ϕ).
• v(θ) = 12 ,v(ϕ) = 1: In this case v(θ ∧ ϕ) =
1
2 ≥ v(θ ∧ ψ) for any ψ.
• v(θ) = 12 ,v(ϕ) =
1
2 : In this case v(θ ∧ ϕ) ∈ {0,
1
2}. If v(ψ) = 0 then v(θ ∧ ψ) = 0 ≤
v(θ ∧ ϕ).
• v(θ) = 0,v(ϕ) = 1: In this case v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 0 = v(θ ∧ ψ) for any ψ.
• v(θ) = 0,v(ϕ) = 12 : In this case v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 0 = v(θ ∧ ψ) for any ψ.
The result for disjunction follows similarly.
Theorems 8 and 9 suggest perhaps that P8 is the most controversial of these additional
properties. The intuition behind it is that the conjunction or disjunction of two borderline
sentences should not take any truth value other than borderline. In general, P8 is clearly
inconsistent with P2 as we can see by considering excluded middle tautologies θ ∨ ¬θ
when θ, and consequently by P1 also ¬θ, is a borderline case7. Of course, P8 also
means that contradictions θ ∧ ¬θ have a non-zero truth value if v(θ) = 12 . In the seminal
paper [7] Fine argues that a theory of vagueness should be able to account for penumbral
connections, these being logical relations between borderline sentences. So, for example,
Fine argues that even if θ has a borderline truth value then θ∨¬θ and θ∧¬θ are true and
false respectively. However, in the case of vague sentences this seem rather a subjective
judgement. One way of gaining insight into this issue would be to undertake experimental
studies into how people actually deal with penumbral connections in natural language.
There have been only a few examples of such studies reported in the literature and broadly
speaking the results are mixed (see [28] for an overview). However, in one such study
Ripley [24] ﬁnds that there is evidence that people are willing to accept contradictions in
borderline cases. We will return to the issue of penumbral connection in the discussion in
section 8. In the sequel we show that it is possible to identify a subclass of supervaluations
which behave as Kleene valuations on a restricted set of sentences and hence which satisfy
P2 generally and P8 in this fragment of the language. Initially, in the following section
we introduce a natural vagueness ordering on three valued valuations and argue that this
provides a strong case against another well known three valued valuation as a model of
explicit borderlines.
7Note that it is not the case that Kleene valuations can be characterised simply by adding P8 to P1 and
P3 since Kleene valuations do not satisfy P3. To see this consider a Kleene valuation for which v(p1) = 1
and v(p2) =
1
2
. Now p1 ≡ (p1 ∧ p2) ∨ (p1 ∧ ¬p2) but for Kleene valuations v((p1 ∧ p2) ∨ (p1 ∧ ¬p2)) =
1
2
.
¬ 1 0
1
2
1
2
0 1
∧ 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
1
2
1
2 0 0
0 0 0 0
∨ 1 12 0
1 1 1 1
1
2 1 1
1
2
0 1 12 0
Table 2:  Lukasiewicz truth tables
4 A Vagueness Ordering
Semantic precision [15] is a natural partial ordering on three valued valuations and concerns
the situation in which one valuation admits more borderline cases than another but where
otherwise their truth values agree. More formally, valuation v1 is less semantically precise
than v2, denoted v1  v2, if they disagree only for some set of sentences of L, which
being identiﬁed as either absolutely true or absolutely false by v2, are classiﬁed as being
borderline cases by v1. In other words, v1 is less semantically precise than v2 if all the 1
and 0 valuations of v1 are preserved by v2. Hence, we might think of semantic precision
as ordering three valued valuations according to their relative vagueness. Shapiro [26]
proposed essentially the same ordering of interpretations which he refers to as sharpening
i.e. v1  v2 means that v2 extends or sharpens v1.
Definition 10. Semantic Precision [15]: For three valued valuations v1 and v2, v1  v2
if and only if ∀θ ∈ SL, v1(θ) ≤ v2(θ) and v1(θ) ≥ v2(θ). Furthermore, v1 ≺ v2 if v1  v2
and v1 6= v2. Note that if P1 holds then v1  v2 if and only if ∀θ ∈ SL, v1(θ) = 1 implies
that v2(θ) = 1.
Theorem 11. Semantic Precision for Kleene and Supervaluations [14], [15]:
• If v is a Kleene valuation on L then let P = {pi ∈ P : v(pi) = 1} and N = {pi ∈ P :
v(pi) = 0}. Then for Kleene valuations v1 and v2, v1  v2 if and only if P1 ⊆ P2
and N1 ⊆ N2.
• Let v1 and v2 be supervaluations on L with sets of admissible valuations Π1 and Π2
respectively. Then v1  v2 if and only if Π1 ⊇ Π2.
At this point it is interesting to consider  Lukasiewicz three valued valuations as a
possible model of explicit borderlines. As for Kleene valuations, these are truth functional
and are deﬁned recursively as follows:
Definition 12.  Lukasiewicz Valuations [20]: A  Lukasiewicz valuation is a three val-
ued valuation deﬁned recursively such that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL; v(¬θ) = 1 − v(θ), v(θ ∧ ϕ) =
max(0,v(θ) + v(ϕ) − 1) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = min(1,v(θ) + v(ϕ)). Truth tables summarizing
these combination rules are given in table 2.
 Lukasiewicz valuations satisfy a number of the principles introduced in section 3, in-
cluding P1, P4, P5, P6 and P7. Although, of course, unlike Kleene valuations they
do not satisfy the borderline principle P8. The following result, however, suggests that
 Lukasiewicz valuations may not be a good model for borderline vagueness since such val-
uations cannot represent diﬀering levels of vagueness in terms of the semantic precision
ordering.
Theorem 13. Let v1 and v2 be  Lukasiewicz valuations then v1 6≺ v2.
Proof. Let v1 and v2 be  Lukasiewicz valuations such that v1 6= v2, and let B1 = {l ∈ LL :
v1(l) =
1
2} and B2 = {l ∈ LL : v2(l) =
1
2}. Now using proof by contradiction we assume
that v1 ≺ v2. In this case by deﬁnition 10 it follows that B2 ⊂ B1. Let l ∈ B1 − B2.
Then v1(l) =
1
2 and by deﬁnition 12 v1(l ∧ l) = 0. Also, v2(l) 6=
1
2 and w.l.o.g we can
assume v2(l) = 1 (otherwise consider ¬l). Hence, v2(l ∧ l) = 1 and therefore by deﬁnition
12 v1 6≺ v2 since both v1(l ∧ l) = 0 < v2(l ∧ l) = 1 and v1(l ∧ l) = 0 < v2(l ∧ l) = 1 which
is a contradiction.
The negative result in theorem 13 is due to  Lukasiewicz valuations satisfying a property
which is dual to P8, namely that the conjunction (or disjunction) of two borderline sen-
tences is never borderline. But this would seem to be completely counter to our intuitive
understanding of vagueness in certain cases. For example, consider the two statements
‘Ethel is short’ and ‘Ethel is rich’ where short and rich are adjectives deﬁned on com-
pletely independent scales and where the two propositions are logically independent in
the sense that a priori, ﬁxing the truth value of one does not constrain the truth value
of the other. However, in this case all  Lukasiewicz valuations for which both propositions
are borderline, give the truth value false to ‘Ethel is short and rich’. In order words in
all states of the world in which Ethel is both borderline rich and borderline short we
are forced to accept a strong penumbral connection according to which Ethel being short
and rich is completely rule out. It is hard to envisage an intuitive interpretation of these
propositions which would justify such an assumption.
Notice that there do exists distinct  Lukasiewicz valuations for which v1 ≺ v2 if we
adopt a weaker semantic precision ordering according to which v1  v2 provided that
the constraints v1(l) ≤ v(l) and v1(l) ≥ v2(l) are satisﬁed for all literals l. However,
this weaker deﬁnition would seem to give unwarranted preference to literals rather than
comparing the vagueness of two valuations across the whole language.
5 Relating Kleene and Supervaluations
We now introduce a particular class of supervaluations which we refer to as complete
bounded supervaluations. These are shown to be strongly related to Kleene valuations,
agreeing with the latter on a fragment of L, but otherwise more semantically precise. A
complete bounded supervaluation on L, is uniquely determined by its truth values on the
propositional variables, but this is via a non-truth functional mapping.
Definition 14. Complete Bounded Supervaluations: Let E be the partial ordering on T
according to which v1 E v2 if and only if ∀pi ∈ P, v1(p1) ≤ v2(pi). Then a complete
bounded supervaluation is a supervaluation with the set of admissible precisiﬁcations of
the form Π = {v ∈ T : v∗ E v E v
∗} where ∀pi ∈ P, v∗(pi) = min{v(pi) : v ∈ Π} and
v∗(pi) = max{v(pi) : v ∈ Π}.
The following is the deﬁnition of a particular subset of the sentences of L, on which we
will later show that complete bounded supervaluations and Kleene valuations coincide.
Definition 15. A Restricted Set of Sentences: Let A = {A ⊆ LL : ∀pi ∈ P, {pi,¬pi} 6⊆
A, {pi,¬pi} ∩ A 6= ∅} where LL denotes the literals of L
8. For A ∈ A, let SLA ⊆ SL
denote the set of sentences of L generated recursively from A using only the connectives ∧
and ∨. Then we deﬁne SL∗ =
⋃
A∈A SLA. Notice that SL
∗ is the subset of the sentences
of L in negated normal form, for which it is not the case that both a propositional variable
and its negation appear.
We now deﬁne a family of partial orderings on the set of Tarski valuations of which the
ordering used in deﬁnition 14 is a particular example. This is mainly a technical device
that is useful in several of the proofs in this section.
Definition 16. A Family of Partial Orderings on T: For A ∈ A we deﬁne the ordering
EA on T such that ∀v1, v2 ∈ T, v1 EA v2 if and only if ∀l ∈ A, v1(l) ≤ v2(l). Notice that
the partial ordering E in deﬁnition 14 corresponds to EP .
Definition 17. Minimal and Maximal Valuations: Let v be a supervaluation with admis-
sible valuations Π ⊆ T, then the maximal and minimal Tarski valuations of v, relative to
the ordering EA for A ∈ A, are deﬁned as follows: v
∗
A, vA∗ ∈ T such that ∀l ∈ A,
v∗A(l) = max{v(l) : v ∈ Π} = v(l) and
vA∗(l) = min{v(l) : v ∈ Π} = v(l)
Notice that v∗ and v
∗ in deﬁnition 14 correspond to vP∗ and v
∗
P respectively.
Lemma 18. Let v be a supervaluation then ∀A ∈ A, v∗ E v
∗
A E v
∗ and v∗ E vA∗ E v
∗.
Proof. Notice that trivially v∗A E v
∗ and v∗ E vA∗, since ∀pi ∈ P, v
∗(pi) = v(pi) and
v∗(pi) = v(pi) and by deﬁnitions 4 and 17 v
∗
A(pi) ≤ v(pi) and vA∗(pi) ≥ v(pi). We now
show that v∗ E vA∗ by considering the following two cases:
8Notice that each A ∈ A deﬁnes a unique Tarski valuation such that v(p) = 1 if p ∈ A and v(p) = 0 if
¬p ∈ A.
1) Suppose pi ∈ A then v
∗
A(pi) = 0 ⇒ (by deﬁnitions 4 and 17) v(pi) = 0 ⇒ v(pi) =
0⇒ v∗(pi) = 0.
2) Suppose ¬pi ∈ A then v
∗
A(pi) = 0 ⇒ (by deﬁnitions 4 and 17) v
∗
A(¬pi) = v(¬pi) =
1⇒ v(pi) = 0⇒ v∗(pi) = 0
Similarly, we show that vA∗ E v
∗ by considering the following cases:
1) Suppose pi ∈ A then vA∗(pi) = 1 ⇒ (by deﬁnitions 4 and 17) v(pi) = 1 ⇒ v(pi) =
1⇒ v∗(pi) = 1.
2) Suppose ¬pi ∈ A then vA∗(pi) = 1⇒ (by deﬁnitions 4 and 17) vA∗(¬pi) = v(¬pi) =
0⇒ v(pi) = 1⇒ v
∗(pi) = 1
as required.
Lemma 19. Let A ∈ A then for v1, v2 ∈ T, if v1 EA v2 then it holds that ∀θ ∈ SLA,
v1(θ) = 1⇒ v2(θ) = 1
Proof. We proceed by induction on SLA. Let SL
0
A = A and SL
k
A = SL
k−1
A ∪{θ∨ϕ, θ∧ϕ :
θ, ϕ ∈ SLk−1A }. Now for l ∈ A the result follows trivially by deﬁnition of 17. Now if
ψ ∈ SLkA then either ψ ∈ SL
k−1
A and the result follows trivially by the inductive hypothesis
or one of the follow holds: For θ, ϕ ∈ SLk−1A ,
• ψ = θ∧ϕ: In this case v1(ψ) = 1→ v1(θ∧ϕ) = 1⇒ v1(θ) = 1, v1(ϕ) = 1⇒ v2(θ) =
1, v2(ϕ) = 1 by induction ⇒ v2(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1⇒ v2(ψ) = 1 as required.
• ψ = θ ∨ ϕ: In this case v1(ψ) = 1 → v1(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 ⇒ v1(θ) = 1 or v1(ϕ) = 1 ⇒
v2(θ) = 1 or v2(ϕ) = 1 by induction ⇒ v2(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1⇒ v2(ψ) = 1 as required.
Theorem 20. Let v be a complete bounded supervaluation and, for some A ∈ A, let vA∗
and v∗A be minimal and maximal valuations generated from v according to deﬁnition 17.
Let v′ be the supervaluation with admissible valuations Π′ = {vA∗, v
∗
A} then ∀θ ∈ SLA,
v(θ) = v′(θ).
Proof. We show that ∀θ ∈ SLA, v(θ) = v
′(θ) and v(θ) = v′(θ).
For θ ∈ SLA if v(θ) = 1 then ∃v ∈ Π such that v(θ) = 1 ⇒ v
∗
A(θ) = 1 since v EA v
∗
A
and by lemma 19. Also, if v′(θ) = 1 then by lemma 19 v∗A(θ) = 1. Now by lemma 18
v∗A ∈ Π since v is a complete bounded supervaluation pair. Hence v(θ) = 1.
Furthermore, if v(θ) = 1 then ∀v ∈ Π, v(θ) = 1. Now by lemma 18 vA∗, v
∗
A ∈ Π since
v is a complete bounded supervaluation pair. Hence v′(θ) = 1. Also, if v′(θ) = 1 ⇒
vA∗(θ) = 1. Hence since ∀v ∈ Π vA∗ EA v, then by lemma 19 it holds that v(θ) = 1.
Corollary 21. Let v be a complete bounded supervaluation and let A ∈ A. Then ∀θ, ϕ ∈
SLA, v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)).
Proof. ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SLA, v(θ∧ϕ) = v
∗
A(θ∧ϕ) by theorem 20 = min(v
∗
A(θ), v
∗
A(ϕ)) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
by theorem 20 as required. Also, by theorem 20 v(θ∨ϕ) = vA∗(θ∨ϕ) = max(vA∗(θ), vA∗(ϕ)) =
max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) as required.
As an immediate consequence of corollary 21 we have that complete bounded superval-
uation pairs obey all the Kleene combination rules for ∧ and ∨ when restricted to SLA for
any A ∈ A. In particular, complete bounded supervaluations satisfy P8 when restricted
to SLA for some A ∈ A. The following result summarizes the strong relationship between
Kleene valuations and complete bounded supervaluations.
Theorem 22. Let vcbs be a complete bounded supervaluation, then there exists a unique
Kleene valuation vk such that vk  vcbs and ∀θ ∈ SL
∗, vk(θ) = vcbs(θ).
Proof. We deﬁne vk such that ∀pi ∈ P, vk(pi) = vcbs(pi). Notice that trivially we have
that ∀l ∈ LL, vk(l) = vcbs(l). We now proceed by induction to show that for any A ∈ A
and ∀θ ∈ SLA, vk(θ) = vcbs(θ). For l ∈ A, the result holds trivially as above. If ψ ∈ SL
k
A
then either ψ ∈ SLk−1A in which case the result follows trivially by the inductive hypothesis
or one of the follow hold: For θ, ϕ ∈ SLk−1A ,
• ψ = θ∧ϕ: In this case v(θ∧ϕ) = min(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) by induction = min(vcbs(θ), vcbs(ϕ)) =
vcbs(θ ∧ ϕ) by deﬁnition 2. Also, vk(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) by induction
= min(vcbs(θ), vcbs(ϕ)) = vcbs(θ ∧ ϕ) by corollary 21.
• ψ = θ∨ϕ: In this case vk(θ∨ϕ) = max(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) by induction = max(vcbs(θ), vcbs(ϕ)) =
vcbs(θ ∨ ϕ) by corollary 21. Also, vk(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) by induction
= max(vcbs(θ), vcbs(ϕ)) = vcbs(θ ∨ ϕ) by deﬁnition 2.
Clearly, vk is the only Kleene valuation which agrees with vcbs on SL
∗ since for any other
Kleene valuation there must exist a propositional variable where it disagrees with vcbs.
We now show by induction that vk  vcbs. Let SL
0 = P and SLk = SLk−1 ∪ {θ ∧
ϕ, θ ∨ ϕ,¬θ : θ, ϕ ∈ SLk−1}. Clearly by the deﬁnition of vk, it holds that ∀pi ∈ P,
vk(pi) = vcbs(pi) and hence the result holds for SL
0. Now suppose that ψ ∈ SLk then
either ψ ∈ SLk−1, in which case the result holds trivially, or ∃θ, ϕ ∈ SLk−1 such that one
of the following cases holds:
• ψ = θ ∧ ϕ: In this case, if vk(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 then by deﬁnition 3 min(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) = 1
which implies that vk(θ) = 1 and vk(ϕ) = 1. Hence, by induction vcbs(θ) = 1 and
vcbs(ϕ) = 1 and by deﬁnition 2 vcbs(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 as required. Also, if vcbs(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1
then by deﬁnition 2 vcbs(θ) = 1 and vcbs(ϕ) = 1 which implies by induction that
vk(θ) = 1 and vk(ϕ) = 1. Hence, min(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) = vk(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1 as required.
• ψ = θ ∨ ϕ: In this case, if vk(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 then by deﬁnition 3 max(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) = 1
which implies that vk(θ) = 1 or vk(ϕ) = 1. Hence, by induction vcbs(θ) = 1 or
vcbs(ϕ) = 1 and by deﬁnition 2 vcbs(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 as required. Also, if vcbs(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1
then by deﬁnition 2 vcbs(θ) = 1 or vcbs(ϕ) = 1 which implies by induction that
vk(θ) = 1 or vk(ϕ) = 1. Hence, max(vk(θ), vk(ϕ)) = vk(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1 as required.
• ψ = ¬θ: In this case, if vk(¬θ) = 1 then vk(θ) = 0 which implies by induction that
vcbs(θ) = 0. Hence, vcbs(¬θ) = 1 as required. Also, if vcbs(¬θ) = 1 then vcbs(θ) = 0
which implies by induction that vk(θ) = 0. Hence, vk(¬θ) = 1 as required.
Theorem 22 is related to an existing result in [15] which, while similar, only holds for
sentences in SLA where either A = P or A = {¬pi : pi ∈ P} although it does hold for a
slightly broader class of supervaluations.
6 Lower and Upper Belief Measures
As repeatedly emphasised above we are not using the third truth value in order to stand
for uncertain or unknown but rather to represent an explicitly borderline case. Instead we
propose that in our current setting, epistemic uncertainty should be quantiﬁed by deﬁning
probabilities over three valued valuations. This is merely an extension of the usual possible
worlds approach to deﬁning measures of belief on the sentences of L, but extended to three
valued truth models. As we will see below such an approach naturally yields a pair of
lower and upper measures on SL.
It is important to note here that we do not intend for there to be a crisp division
between epistemic uncertainty and vagueness, with the latter referring only to borderline
cases. As noted by Keefe and Smith [9], vagueness is a multifaceted phenomenon and
vague predicates exhibit blurred boundaries as well as borderline cases. We have consis-
tently argued that the former can be understood as resulting from a type of epistemic
uncertainty about what is the correct deﬁnition of predicates in language [13], [15], [17].
This semantic or linguistic uncertainty [12] naturally results from the distributed manner
in which language is learned through repeated interactions between individuals [23], [13].
On the other hand, there is also often epistemic uncertainty about the state of the world
occurring in conjunction with both blurred boundaries and explicit borderlines.
To illustrate these ideas recall the earlier example of the predicate short deﬁned by
lower and upper threshold values h ≤ h. In this case linguistic uncertainty manifests itself
in terms of uncertainty about the exact values of the thresholds h and h. Furthermore, if
we are interested in the truth value of the proposition ‘Ethel is short’ then we also need
to take account of Ethel’s height h about which we might also be uncertain i.e. this being
uncertainty about the state of the world. Hence, by treating both types of uncertainty as
being epistemic in nature, and deﬁning a joint distribution over h, h and h together with
similar variables relevant to the other propositions in the language, would then naturally
result in a probability distribution over the valuations of L. Given such as distribution we
can naturally deﬁne lower and upper belief measures on SL as follows:
Definition 23. Belief Pairs [14], [15]: Let V be a ﬁnite set of three valued valuations and
w be a probability distribution on V then we deﬁne a belief pair as a pair of lower and
upper measures ~µ = (µ, µ) where µ, µ : SL → [0, 1] such that ∀θ ∈ SL;
µ(θ) = w({v ∈ V : v(θ) = 1}) and µ(θ) = w({v ∈ V : v(θ) 6= 0}). 9
It can also be interesting to consider mid-point belief degrees generated from a belief
pair by taking the average of the lower and upper measures as follows:
Definition 24. Mid-Point Belief Degrees [17]: Let V be a ﬁnite set of three valued val-
uations and w be a probability distribution on V and let ~µ = (µ, µ) be the corresponding
belief pair as given in deﬁnition 23 then the corresponding mid-point belief degree (belief
degree for short) β : SL → [0, 1] is deﬁned as follows: ∀θ ∈ SL;
β(θ) =
µ(θ) + µ(θ)
2
= w({v ∈ V : v(θ) = 1}) +
w({v ∈ V : v(θ) = 12})
2
Hence, we can think of β(θ) as being determined by reallocating the probability associated
with truth value 12 evenly between the probabilities associated with truth values 0 and 1.
Furthermore, β(θ) is in fact the expected truth value of θ given distribution w, i.e. β(θ) =
E(v(θ)) [29]. The use of the term belief degree in this content is therefore consistent with
Smith’s proposal [27] that the degree of belief of a sentence should be generally deﬁned as
its expected truth value.
In earlier work [17] we have used the term truth degree instead of belief degree for mid-
point measures of the above form. This is perhaps not ideal since here we are referring to
a measure of subjective belief rather than to a truth value in inﬁnite valued logic, in which
context the term truth degree it is more typically applied. On the other hand, later in this
section we will describe how belief degrees can provide a characterisation of a certain type
of inﬁnite valued truth (see theorem 25), thus providing a strong link between these two
concepts.
9We are assuming here that there is suﬃcient information to allow agents to quantify their uncertainty
using a precise probability distribution on V. It would also be interesting to consider the case in which
uncertainty was quantiﬁed by a set of probability distributions (a credal set) over three valued valuations
but this is beyond the scope of the current paper. Also notice that we are abusing notation slightly here
and using the same symbol for the probability distribution w and the measure that it generates.
In the cases that V is restricted only to supervaluations or to Kleene valuations we
refer to ~µ as a supervaluation belief pair or a Kleene belief pair respectively. Further-
more, ~µ is a complete bounded supervaluation belief pair if V is restricted to complete
bounded supervaluations 10. It is well known that supervaluation belief pairs correspond
to Dempster-Shafer belief and plausibility measures on SL [8], [6]. However, the speciﬁc
properties of complete bounded supervaluation belief pairs have only recently been studied
[15] and we recall some of them later in this section. There is also a clear link between
belief degrees determined from supervaluations belief pairs and credibility measures as
initially proposed by Dubois and Prade [3] and later developed at some length by liu and
liu [19]. In fact, credibility measures are deﬁned from necessity and possibility measures
and hence, in the current context, relate to cases in which there is only uncertainty about
the correct level of vagueness at which the language should be interpreted, as represented
by the semantic precision ordering. We will consider exactly this case in the sequel.
Kleene belief pairs have been proposed independently in [14] and [29]. We now recap
on some of their properties including a surprising characterisation of min-max fuzzy logic
as shown in [17]. Furthermore, we exploit theorem 22 in order to extend a result in [15]
and hence to clarify the relationship between Kleene belief pairs and complete bounded
supervaluation belief pairs.
Notice that if V is restricted to valuations which satisfy P1 then trivially by deﬁnition
23 we have duality between the lower and upper measures so that ∀θ ∈ SL;
µ(¬θ) = 1− µ(θ) and µ(¬θ) = 1− µ(θ)
Furthermore, by theorem 5 it follows that supervaluation belief pairs satisfy the following
• If |= θ then ~µ(θ) = (1, 1).
• If θ ≡ ϕ then ~µ(θ) = ~µ(ϕ).
By deﬁnition 23 it follows immediately that ∀θ ∈ SL;
w({v ∈ V : v(θ) =
1
2
}) = µ(θ)− µ(θ)
In addition, for Kleene belief pairs we have that ∀θ ∈ SL;
µ(θ ∧ ¬θ) = 2β(θ ∧ ¬θ) = w({v ∈ V : v(θ) =
1
2
})
In contrast, for supervaluation belief pairs the fact that supervaluations satisfy P2 ensures
that:
µ(θ ∧ ¬θ) = β(θ ∧ ¬θ) = 0
10In light of the discussion in section 4 we will not consider probabilities deﬁned over  Lukasiewicz
valuations in this paper. Instead we refer the reader to the work of Mundici [21], [22] which investigates
probability measures deﬁned over MV algebras with  Lukasiewicz operators.
In general, Kleene belief pairs are additive so that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL;
µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = µ(θ) + µ(ϕ)− µ(θ ∧ ϕ) and µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = µ(θ) + µ(ϕ) − µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
In contrast, for supervaluation belief pairs µ is super-additive and µ is sub-additive so
that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL;
µ(θ ∨ ϕ) ≥ µ(θ) + µ(ϕ)− µ(θ ∧ ϕ) and µ(θ ∨ ϕ) ≤ µ(θ) + µ(ϕ) − µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
We now consider a special case of belief pairs in which an agent’s uncertainty relates
only to the level of vagueness at which L should be interpreted. More formally this means
that w is non-zero only on a set of valuations which can be totally ordered according to
semantic precision (deﬁnition 10). The following results taken from [14] and [17] summarize
the properties of Kleene belief pairs under this assumption and in particular that the
resulting mid-point belief degrees provide a complete characterisation of min-max fuzzy
logic [30].
Theorem 25. [17] Let ζ : SL → [0, 1] then ζ satisﬁes ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, ζ(¬θ) = 1 − ζ(θ),
ζ(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(ζ(θ), ζ(ϕ)) and ζ(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(ζ(θ), ζ(ϕ)) if and only if ∀θ ∈ SL, ζ(θ) =
µ(θ)+µ(θ)
2 where ~µ = (µ, µ) is a Kleene Belief pair generated by a probability distribution w
over Kleene valuations such that {v : w(v) > 0} = {v1, . . . ,vr} and v1  . . .  vr.
Theorem 26. [17] Let β : SL → [0, 1] be a belief degree generated from a Kleene belief
pair as in theorem 25. Then ∀θ ∈ SL;
µ(θ) = max(0, 2β(θ) − 1) and µ(θ) = min(1, 2β(θ))
Corollary 27. [14] [17] Let ~µ be a Kleene belief pair generated from a probability distri-
bution w for which {v : w(v) > 0} = {v1, . . . ,vr} where v1  . . .  vr. Then ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL;
µ(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)), µ(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)) and
µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)), µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µ(θ), µ(ϕ))
We now consider the relationship between Kleene belief pairs and complete bounded
supervaluation pairs. The following results extend those given in [15] to a wider class of
propositional formulae. Theorem 28 exploits corollary 21 and theorem 22 to show the
properties of complete bounded supervaluation belief pairs under the above assumption
that all uncertainty concerns semantic precision, while theorem 30 demonstrates the equiv-
alence between Kleene belief pairs and complete bounded supervaluation belief pairs for
all sentences in SL∗.
Theorem 28. Let ~µ be a complete bounded supervaluation belief pair generated from a
probability distribution w for which {v : w(v) > 0} = {v1, . . . ,vr} where v1  . . .  vr.
Then for any A ∈ A, it holds that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SLA;
µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)) and µ(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ(θ), µ(ϕ))
Proof. By the conditions of the theorem it follows that for any θ ∈ SL, if vi(θ) = 1 then
vj(θ) = 1 for j = i + 1, . . . , r. Hence, ∃t ≤ r such that {vi : vi(θ) = 1} = {vt, . . . ,vr}.
Similarly for ϕ ∈ SL, ∃t′ ≤ r such that {vi : vi(ϕ) = 1} = {vt′ , . . . ,vr}. Now if θ, ϕ ∈ SLA
then by corollary 21 we have that:
µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = w({v : v(θ ∨ ϕ) = 1}) = w({v : max(v(θ), v(ϕ)) = 1})
=
r∑
j=min(t,t′)
w(vj) = max(µ(θ), µ(ϕ))
The result for µ(θ ∧ ϕ) also follows similarly from corollary 21.
Corollary 29. Let ~µ be a complete bounded supervaluation belief pair generated from a
probability distribution w for which {v : w(v) > 0} = {v1, . . . ,vr} where v1  . . .  vr.
Then for any A ∈ A, it holds that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SLA;
µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)) and µ(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ(θ), µ(ϕ))
and ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL;
µ(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)) and µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(µ(θ), µ(ϕ))
Proof. The restriction that w is non-zero only on v1  . . .  vr ensures that µ and µ
are necessity and possibility measures on SL respectively. Hence, ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL, µ(θ ∧ ϕ) =
min(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)) and µ(θ ∨ ϕ) = min(µ(θ), µ(ϕ)). The result then follows trivially from
theorem 28.
Theorem 30. Let ~µ1 be a complete bounded supervaluation belief pair on SL, then there
is a Kleene belief pair ~µ2 on SL such that ∀θ ∈ SL
∗, ~µ1(θ) = ~µ2(θ) and ∀θ ∈ SL,
µ
1
(θ) ≥ µ
2
(θ) and µ1(θ) ≤ µ2(θ).
Proof. Let Vk and Vcbs denote the sets of Kleene valuations and complete bounded su-
pervaluations on L respectively. For any complete bounded supervaluation vcbs, let vk
be the unique Kleene valuation determined by ∀pi ∈ P, vk(pi) = vcbs(pi) as in the proof
of theorem 22. Furthermore, let f : Vcbs → Vk denote the bijective functional mapping
according to which f(vcbs) = vk. Now let w1 be a probability distribution on Vcbs then
we deﬁne a corresponding distribution w2 on Vk, such that ∀v ∈ Vcbs, w2(f(v)) = w1(v).
Then by theorem 22 we have that: ∀θ ∈ SL∗
µ
1
(θ) = w1({v ∈ Vcbs : v(θ) = 1}) = w1({v ∈ Vcbs : f(v)(θ) = 1})
= w2({v ∈ Vk : v(θ) = 1}) = µ2(θ)
It then follows similarly that µ1(θ) = µ2(θ).
Furthermore, from theorem 22 we have that f(v)  v. Hence, ∀θ ∈ SL;
µ
2
(θ) = w2({v ∈ Vk : v(θ) = 1}) = w1({v ∈ Vcbs : f(v)(θ) = 1})
≤ w1({v ∈ Vcbs : v(θ) = 1}) = µ1(θ)
The proof that µ2(θ) ≥ µ1(θ) follows similarly.
7 Conditional Belief Pairs
In this section we propose a conditioning model according to which belief pairs can be
updated on the basis of new information about the truth value of sentences of L. In view
of the inherently probabilistic nature of belief pairs we will adopt an approach based on
conditional probability. For this approach we assume that new knowledge takes the form
of constraints on the three valued truth values of sentences of L. Given the interconnection
between vagueness and uncertain discussed in the previous section then we can think of
such constraints as providing new information both about the state of the world and about
the underlying interpretation of L.
Definition 31. Conditional Belief Pairs [16]: Suppose an agent obtains new knowledge
regarding sentences in SL in the form of a set of constraints K on three valued valuations
of the following form:
K = {v(ϕi) ∈ Zi : i = 1, . . . , t} where Zi ⊆ {0,
1
2
, 1} and ϕi ∈ SL for i = 1, . . . , t
Given a prior probability distribution on V then we deﬁne lower and upper belief pairs
conditional on K as follows: ∀θ ∈ SL;
µ(θ|K) =
w({v ∈ V(K) : v(θ) = 1})
w(V(K))
and µ(θ|K) =
w({v ∈ V(K) : v(θ) = 1})
w(V(K))
where V(K) ⊆ V is the set of three valued valuations in V which satisfy K. The corre-
sponding conditional belief degree given K is then deﬁned by:
β(θ|K) =
µ(θ|K) + µ(θ|K)
2
Theorem 32. [16] If w is deﬁned on a subset of the Kleene valuations on L, then ∀θ, ϕ ∈
SL such that µ(ϕ) > 0;
µ(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
µ(ϕ)
, µ(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
µ(θ ∨ ¬ϕ)− µ(¬ϕ)
1− µ(¬ϕ)
and
µ(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
µ(θ ∨ ¬ϕ)− µ(¬ϕ)
1− µ(¬ϕ)
, µ(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
µ(ϕ)
Theorem 33. If w is deﬁned on a subset of the supervaluations on L, then ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL
such that µ(ϕ) > 0;
µ(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
µ(ϕ)
, µ(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
µ(θ ∨ ¬ϕ)− µ(¬ϕ)
1− µ(¬ϕ)
and
µ(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) ≤
µ(θ ∨ ¬ϕ)− µ(¬ϕ)
1− µ(¬ϕ)
, µ(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) ≥
µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
µ(ϕ)
Proof. We assume that V is a subset of the supervaluations on L. Then
µ(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
w({v ∈ V : v(θ) = 1,v(ϕ) = 1})
w({v ∈ V : v(ϕ) = 1})
=
w({v ∈ V : v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1})
w({v ∈ V : v(ϕ) = 1})
=
µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
µ(ϕ)
Furthermore,
µ(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
w({v ∈ V : v(θ) 6= 0,v(ϕ) 6= 0})
w({v ∈ V : v(ϕ) 6= 0})
≥
w({v ∈ V : v(θ ∧ ϕ) 6= 0)
w({v ∈ V : v(ϕ) 6= 0})
=
µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
µ(ϕ)
This follows since v(θ∧ϕ) 6= 0⇒ v(θ) 6= 0 and v(ϕ) 6= 0 whilst the converse does not hold.
In particular, it is possible that both the sets {v ∈ Π : v(θ) = 1} and {v ∈ Π : v(ϕ) = 1}
are non-empty but that their intersection is empty. The remaining results then follow by
duality by considering the following relationships:
µ(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) = 1− µ(¬θ|v(ϕ) = 1) and µ(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) = 1− µ(¬θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0)
Corollary 34. If w is deﬁned on a subset of the complete bounded supervaluations on L,
then for A ∈ A it holds that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SLA;
µ(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
µ(ϕ)
, µ(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
µ(θ ∨ ¬ϕ)− µ(¬ϕ)
1− µ(¬ϕ)
and
µ(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
µ(θ ∨ ¬ϕ)− µ(¬ϕ)
1− µ(¬ϕ)
, µ(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
µ(ϕ)
Proof. By corollary 21 we have that v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ)). Hence,
w({v ∈ V : v(θ) 6= 0,v(ϕ) 6= 0}) = w({v ∈ V : v(θ) = 1, v(ϕ) = 1})
= w({v ∈ V : min(v(θ), v(ϕ)) = 1}) = w({v ∈ V : v(θ ∧ ϕ) = 1})
Therefore,
µ(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
µ(θ ∧ ϕ)
µ(ϕ)
Consequently by duality we have that,
µ(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
µ(θ ∨ ¬ϕ)− µ(¬ϕ)
1− µ(¬ϕ)
The result then follows by theorem 33.
Given that supervaluation belief pairs correspond to Dempster-Shafer belief and plausi-
bility measure on SL [8], [6], then from theorem 33 we note that by takingK = {v(ϕ) = 1}
we obtain the standard model of Dempster-Shafer conditioning as originally proposed [25].
In view of our assumption about the non-epistemic nature of the borderline truth
value, it then makes sense for an agent to condition their beliefs given the information
that a particular sentence is borderline. For example, if we learn that Ethel is borderline
short then this provides us with new information about her height. In contrast, simply
being told that it is unknown whether or not Ethel is short provides us with no additional
information about her height. For the case of Kleene belief pairs the resulting lower and
upper measures have the following simple form [16]:
µ(θ|v(ϕ) =
1
2
) =
µ(θ ∨ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)− µ(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
1− µ(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
and µ(θ|v(ϕ) =
1
2
) =
µ(θ ∧ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)
µ(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)
It is also interesting to consider conditioning in those situations in which the only
uncertainty relates to the level of vagueness of L, as ordered according to semantic precision
(deﬁnition 10). In the light of theorem 25 we focus on belief degree conditioning in this
context.
Lemma 35. Let v1  . . .  vr be an totally ordered set of Kleene valuations on L. Let
bi : SL → {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , 2r such that ∀θ ∈ SL;
bi(θ) =
{
vi(θ) : i ≤ r
v2r+1−i : i > r
Furthermore, for θ ∈ SL let iθ = min{i : bi(θ) = 1}. Then the following hold: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL;
(1) iθ∧ϕ = max(iθ, iϕ) and iθ∨ϕ = min(iθ, iϕ).
(2) i¬θ = 2r + 2− iθ.
Proof. The proof of part (1) is given in [17].
(2) For i ≤ r we have that bi(¬θ) = 1 if and only if vi(¬θ) = 1 if and only if vi(θ) = 0 if
and only if b2r+1−i(θ) = 0.
Also, for i > r we have that bi(¬θ) = 1 if and only if v2r+1−i(¬θ) = 1 if and only
if v2r+1−i(θ) = 0 if and only if b2r+1−i(θ) = 0. Hence, ∀i, bi(¬θ) = 1 if and only if
b2r+i−1(θ) = 0 if and only if 2r+ i−1 ≤ iθ−1 if and only if i ≥ 2r+2− iθ as required.
Theorem 36. Let ~µ be a Kleene valuation pair generated from a probability distribution
w for which {v : w(v) > 0} = {v1, . . . ,vr} where v1  . . .  vr and let β : SL → [0, 1] be
the associated belief degree. Then if µ(ϕ) > 0 it holds that ∀θ ∈ SL;
β(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
{
min(1, β(θ)+β(ϕ)−12β(ϕ)−1 ) : β(θ) > β(¬ϕ)
0 : otherwise
Proof. Let iK = min{i : vi(ϕ) = 1} so that {v : v(ϕ) = 1} = {viK , . . . ,vr}. Hence, the
condition K = {v(ϕ) = 1} restricts us to a subset of valuations which can then be used
to generate the following sequence of binary mappings:
viK ≤ . . . ≤ vr ≤ vr ≤ . . . ≤ viK
which can also be written as:
biK ≤ . . . ≤ br ≤ br+1 ≤ . . . ≤ b2r+1−iK
Notice that since µ(ϕ) > 0 then iK ≤ r. From this it follows that bi(ϕ) = 1 if and only if
i ≥ iK if and only if iK = iϕ. Furthermore, by theorem 26
µ(ϕ) = max(0, 2β(ϕ) − 1)
Hence, µ(ϕ) > 0 if and only if 2β(ϕ) − 1 > 0 if and only if β(ϕ) > 12 . Therefore,
w(vi|v(ϕ) = 1) =
{
w(vi)
2β(ϕ)−1 : i ≥ iK
0 : i < iK
Hence, we can deﬁne:
w′(bi|v(ϕ) = 1) =
{
w(vi|v(ϕ)=1)
2 : i ≤ r
w(v2r+1−i|v(ϕ)=1)
2 : i > r
Therefore,
w′(bi|v(ϕ) = 1) =
{
w′(bi)
2β(ϕ)−1 : i = iK , . . . , 2r + 1− iK
0 : otherwise
Now from above it follows that:
β(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
2r∑
i=iθ
w′(bi|v(ϕ) = 1)
Now w′(~vi|v(ϕ) = 1) > 0 if and only if iϕ = iK ≤ i ≤ 2r + 1− iK = 2r + 1− iϕ = i¬ϕ − 1
by lemma 35. Hence, if iθ ≥ i¬ϕ if and only if β(θ) ≤ β(¬ϕ) then β(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) = 0.
Otherwise:
β(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
∑2r+1−iK
i=max(iK ,iθ)
w′(bi)
2β(ϕ) − 1
=
∑i¬ϕ−1
i=max(iϕ,iθ)
w′(bi)
2β(ϕ) − 1
Also by lemma 35,
i¬ϕ−1∑
i=max(iϕ,iθ)
w′(bi) =
i¬ϕ−1∑
i=iθ∧ϕ
w′(bi) =
2r∑
i=iθ∧ϕ
w′(bi)−
2r∑
i=i¬ϕ
w′(bi) = β(θ ∧ ϕ)− β(¬ϕ)
= β(θ ∧ ϕ)− (1− β(ϕ)) = min(β(θ), β(ϕ)) + β(ϕ)− 1
Hence,
β(θ|v(ϕ) = 1) =
min(β(θ), β(ϕ)) + β(ϕ)− 1
2β(ϕ) − 1
= min(1,
β(θ) + β(ϕ)− 1
2β(ϕ) − 1
)
as required.
Theorem 37. Let ~µ be a Kleene valuation pair generated from a probability distribution
w for which {v : w(v) > 0} = {v1, . . . ,vr} where v1  . . .  vr and let β : SL → [0, 1] be
the associated belief degree. Then if µ(ϕ) > 0 it holds that ∀θ ∈ SL;
β(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =


2β(ϕ)+β(θ)−1
2β(ϕ) : β(θ) > β(¬ϕ)
1
2 : β(ϕ) ≤ β(θ) ≤ β(¬ϕ)
β(θ)
2β(ϕ) : β(θ) < β(ϕ)
Proof. Let iK = max{i : vi(ϕ) = 1} so that {vi : vi(ϕ) = 1} = {v1, . . . ,viK}. Hence, the
condition K = {v(ϕ) 6= 0} restricts us to a subset of valuations which can then be used
to generate the following sequence of binary mappings:
v1 ≤ . . . ≤ viK ≤ viK ≤ . . . ≤ v1
which can also be written as:
b1 ≤ . . . ≤ biK ≤ b2r+1−iK ≤ . . . ≤ b2r
Now there are two possibilities:
1) iϕ ≤ r if and only if ∀i, vi(ϕ) = 1 if and only if iK = r
2) iϕ > r if and only if vi(ϕ) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , 2r+1−iϕ if and only if iK = 2r+1−iϕ =
i¬ϕ − 1 by lemma 35.
Now for case 1) we have that w({v(ϕ) 6= 0}) = 1 and hence β(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) = β(θ).
Furthermore, w({v(ϕ) 6= 0}) = µ(ϕ) = 1 if and only if β(ϕ) ≥ 12 by theorem 26. Now
consider case 2) where µ(θ) < 1 if and only if β(ϕ) < 12 . In this case by theorem 26 we
have that:
µ(ϕ) = min(1, 2β(ϕ)) = 2β(ϕ)
Hence,
w(vi|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
{
w(vi)
2β(ϕ) : i = 1, . . . , iK
0 : otherwise
Taking,
w′(bi|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
{
w(vi|v(ϕ)6=0)
2 : i ≤ r
w(v2r+1−i)
2 : i > r
then we have that:
w′(bi|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
{
w′(bi)
2β(ϕ) : i ≤ iK or i ≥ 2r + 1− iK
0 : otherwise
For θ ∈ SL we now consider the following three cases:
2 a) iθ ≤ iK = i¬ϕ − 1 if and only if β(θ) > β(¬ϕ): In this case:
β(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
2r∑
i=iθ
w′(bi|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
∑iK
i=iθ
w′(bi) +
∑2r
i=2r+1−iK
w′(bi)
2β(ϕ)
=
∑iK
i=iθ
w′(bi) +
∑2r
i=iϕ
w′(bi)
2β(ϕ)
=
∑iK
i=iθ
w′(bi) + β(ϕ)
2β(ϕ)
Now
iK∑
i=iθ
w′(bi) =
i¬ϕ−1∑
i=iθ
w′(bi) =
2r∑
i=iθ
w′(bi)−
2r∑
i=i¬ϕ
w′(bi)
= β(θ)− β(¬ϕ) = β(θ) + β(ϕ) − 1
Hence,
β(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
β(θ) + β(ϕ) − 1 + β(ϕ)
2β(ϕ)
=
2β(ϕ) + β(θ)− 1
2β(ϕ)
as required.
2 b) i¬ϕ − 1 = iK < iθ ≤ 2r + 1 − iK = iϕ if and only if β(ϕ) ≤ β(θ) ≤ β(¬ϕ): In this
case,
β(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
2r∑
i=iθ
w′(bi|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
2r∑
i=2r+1−iK
w′(bi|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
∑2r
i=2r+1−iK
w′(bi)
2β(ϕ)
=
∑2r
i=iϕ
w′(bi)
2β(ϕ)
=
β(ϕ)
2β(ϕ)
=
1
2
as required.
2 c) iθ > 2r + 1− iK = iϕ if and only if β(θ) < β(ϕ): In this case,
β(θ|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
2r∑
i=iθ
w′(bi|v(ϕ) 6= 0) =
∑2r
i=iθ
w′(bi)
2β(ϕ)
=
β(θ)
2β(ϕ)
as required.
Note that despite the characterisation of min-max fuzzy logic given by theorem 25,
there does not appear to be a close link between the conditional belief degrees given in
theorems 36 and 37 and any of the fuzzy logic implication operators proposed in the
literature (see [11] for an overview). This is perhaps not surprising given our use of
probabilistic conditioning, this being in contrast to fuzzy implication operators which are
usually envisaged as being a many valued generalisation of the implication connective in
classical logic.
The following example serves to illustrate the main ideas concerning conditional belief
in a three valued setting as introduced in this section.
Example 38. Consider an experiment in which a fair die is tossed twice such that the ﬁrst
and second throws are independent. Let X and Y be the random variables corresponding to
the sum of the two scores and the maximum of the two scores respectively. An agent aims
to evaluate their beliefs in the propositions pi : i = 1, . . . , 12 and qj : j = 1, . . . , 6 where
pi =‘X is about i’ and qj =‘Y is about j’. These propositions are interpreted according to
the following three valued valuation:
v(pi) =


1 : X = i
1
2 : X ∈ {i− 1, i + 1}
0 : otherwise
and v(qj) =


1 : Y = j
1
2 : Y ∈ {j − 1, j + 1}
0 : otherwise
Now suppose that the agent learns that the outcome of the experiment is such that v(q3) =
1
2 then they can then infer that Y ∈ {2, 4} and consequently that the outcome of the
experiment is one of the following pairs of scores; (1, 2), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 4), (3, 4),
(4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3) or (4, 4). Given that each of these outcomes is equally likely then the
agent infers the following conditional beliefs for p5:
µ(p5|v(q3) =
1
2
) = P (X = 5|Y ∈ {2, 4}) =
1
5
µ(p5|v(q3) =
1
2
) = P (X ∈ {4, 5, 6}|Y ∈ {2, 4}) =
1
2
β(p5|v(q3) =
1
2
) =
1
5 +
1
2
2
=
7
20
Furthermore, suppose that in addition to uncertainty about the outcome of the experiment,
the agent also has semantic uncertainty about how pi and qj should be interpreted. More
speciﬁcally, the agent considers that there are two types of interpretation of these propo-
sitions, one strict and one more relaxed. Here we assume that the strict interpretation is
as above, while the relaxed interpretation is deﬁned by the following three valued valuation:
v(pi) =


1 : X = i
1
2 : X ∈ {i− 2, i − 1, i + 1, i+ 2}
0 : otherwise
and
v(qj) =


1 : Y = j
1
2 : Y ∈ {j − 2, j − 1, j + 1, j + 2}
0 : otherwise
We assume that the agent believes that either the strict interpretation should apply to all
propositions with probability 12 or that the relaxed interpretation should apply to all propo-
sitions also with probability 12 . Furthermore, we assume that the choice between strict and
relaxed interpretations is independent of the outcome of the experiment. Now if the agent
learns that v(q3) =
1
2 then under the strict interpretation this implies that Y ∈ {2, 4} and
under the relaxed interpretation that Y ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5}. The former identiﬁes the outcomes
described above while the latter identiﬁes the following outcomes of the experiment; (1, 1),
(1, 2), (1, 4), (1, 5), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 4), (3, 5), (1, 4), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 4),
(4, 5), (1, 5), (2, 5), (3, 5), (4, 5) and (5, 5). Hence, the agent now evaluates the following
conditional beliefs for p5:
µ(p5|v(q3) =
1
2
) =
1
2
P (X = 5|Y ∈ {2, 4}) +
1
2
P (X = 5|Y ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5}) =
1
2
(
1
5
)
+
1
2
(
1
10
)
=
3
20
µ(p5|v(q3) =
1
2
) =
1
2
P (X ∈ {4, 5, 6}|Y ∈ {2, 4}) +
1
2
P (X ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}|Y ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5})
=
1
2
(
1
2
)
+
1
2
(
3
5
)
=
11
20
β(p5|v(q3) =
1
2
) =
3
20 +
11
20
2
=
7
20
8 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we have explored the interconnection between vagueness and uncertainty
in a propositional logic setting by considering explicitly borderline cases in conjunction
with epistemic uncertainty. The former are not a result of uncertainty at all, but arise as
the result of an inherently non-Boolean underlying truth model. Furthermore, the latter
includes both uncertainty about the state of the world as well as linguistic (semantic)
uncertainty about the interpretation of the language. Indeed we have argued that the
blurred boundaries which are typical of vague predicates result from linguistic uncertainty,
this reinforcing the claim that there is no strict division between epistemic uncertainty
and vagueness. Instead explicit borderlines and blurred boundaries are both part of the
complex phenomenon of vagueness, some aspects of which are probabilistic and some
of which are non-probabilistic in nature. Also, vagueness usually occurs together with
uncertainty about the state of the world which is often probabilistic.
We have proposed an integrated model which combines three value logic, represent-
ing borderline cases, and probability, quantifying uncertainty. A summary of the main
contributions of this paper is as follows. We have provided axiomatic characterisations
of two well known types of three valued valuations, supervaluations and Kleene valua-
tions, and we have explored the sometimes close relationship between them. To a certain
extend this clariﬁes the assumptions made in both cases, so as to help us judge if they
are reasonable given our interpretation of the third truth value as meaning borderline.
Furthermore, we have described belief pairs of lower and upper measures, as naturally
generated from a probability distribution deﬁned over a ﬁnite set of three valued valu-
ations. By deﬁning probabilities over supervaluations we obtain Dempster-Shafer belief
and plausibility measures over the sentences of the language. By exploiting the results
relating Kleene valuations and supervaluations, it is then shown that there is a close rela-
tionship between a special case of these measures and Kleene belief pairs generated from a
probability distribution deﬁned over Kleene valuations. The latter also provide a complete
characterisation of min-max fuzzy logic in the case when the uncertainty concerns only
the level of vagueness at which the language should be interpreted. Finally, in keeping
with the probabilistic underpinnings of this approach we have deﬁned conditional belief
pairs based on conditional probabilities over three valued valuations and have given some
new results for both Kleene and supervaluation belief pairs in this context.
The results presented in section 5 of this paper show that complete bounded superval-
uations are equivalent to Kleene valuations on a signiﬁcant subset of the sentences of L,
whilst still preserving classical equivalences as required by theorem 5. Kleene valuations
are completely truth functional so that the truth value of any compound sentence can be
determined from the truth values of its components by means of recursive application of a
set of truth functions, one for each of the connectives in the language. Complete bounded
supervaluations are also functional but in a weaker sense. For this class of valuations,
while it is not the case that there is a ﬁxed set of truth functions associated with the
connectives which can be applied recursively in order to determine the truth value of any
sentence, it is nonetheless the case that the truth values of the propositional variables
completely determine the truth values of all the sentences of L. To see this notice that by
deﬁnition 14, for a complete bounded supervaluation the set of admissible valuations and
hence the entire valuation is determined by v∗ and v
∗. Furthermore, since for all propo-
sitional variables v∗(pi) = v(pi) and v
∗(pi) = v(pi) it follows that Π can be completely
determined from v(pi) : i = 1, . . . , n. Now for Kleene valuations truth functionality un-
derlies their inability to represent penumbral connections, including those in the form of
classical tautologies. Complete bounded supervaluations do capture the latter but they
are still severely limited in the type of penumbral connections that they can encode. For
example, consider the propositions p1 =‘Ethel is middle class’ and p2 =‘Ethel is rich’ and
suppose that v(p1) = v(p2) =
1
2 . In this case we might expect that there would be a
penumbral connection between p1 and p2 according to which being middle class would
rule out being rich and vice versa. This would suggest that Π should not contain any
Tarski valuations for which v(p1 ∧ p2) = 1. In fact it might well be appropriate to assume
an even stronger relationship according to which, if both p1 and p2 have borderline truth
values then p1 is equivalent to ¬p2
11. In this case Π should also not contain valuations for
which v(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2) = 1. However, by deﬁnition 14 any complete bounded supervaluation
for which v(p1) = v(p2) =
1
2 must have a set of admissible valuations containing at least
one valuation for which v(p1 ∧ p2) = 1 and at least one for which v(¬p1 ∧ ¬p2) = 1. Con-
sequently, we see that complete bounded supervaluations will tend to be inappropriate
when there are important penumbral connections beyond those which are represented by
classical tautologies and contradictions. On the other hand, when this is not the case then
the functionality of complete bounded supervaluations provides computational advantages
similar to those of Kleene valuations whilst preserving an underlying classical framework.
The relationship between Kleene and complete bounded supervaluations is carried
over to belief pairs, as described in section 6. In this context an interesting case is that in
which there is only uncertainty about the level of vagueness at which sentences should be
interpreted. For Kleene belief pairs the resulting measures on SL turn out to be fully truth
functional as based on the minimum and maximum operators (see theorem 25). Under the
same assumptions supervaluation belief pairs are necessity and possibility measures on the
sentences of L. Making the further restriction to complete bounded supervaluation pairs
results in a subclass of necessity and possibility measures which follow both the minimum
and maximum rules for conjunction and disjunction respectively, on a signiﬁcant fragment
of the language (see corollary 29). This relationship between Kleene and complete bounded
supervaluation belief pairs may then perhaps explain some of the confusion about the
diﬀerence between fuzzy logic and possibility theory as, for example, outlined in [2].
The use of conditional probability in the deﬁnition of conditional belief pairs, as de-
scribed in section 7, seems natural given the probabilistic treatment of uncertainty that we
have adopted. Furthermore, the resulting measures allow for conditioning on knowledge
relating to the full range of truth values of the sentences of L. For example, according
to the proposed model it is possible to condition on the knowledge that a sentence is
true, that it is not false or that it is borderline. It remains unclear, however, what is the
exact relationship between this form of conditional measures and the various implication
11For example, this could hold if the concepts middle class and rich were deﬁned only by income.
operators used in fuzzy logics. In particular, theorem 36 and 37 show that even in the
case when all valuations with non-zero probability form a nested sequence ordered by se-
mantic precision, the resulting conditional belief degrees do not coincide with any of the
commonly used implication operators. Perhaps the reason for this can be found in an ex-
tension to the analysis of Lewis [18] comparing conditional probabilities with probabilities
of material conditionals. Such a study could be illuminating with regard to the general
issue of conditioning in a non-classical setting and should be part of future research into
this topic.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor for their insightful comments
and suggestions.
References
[1] D. Ciucci, D. Dubois, J. Lawry, (2014), ‘Borderline vs. Unknown: Comparing Three-
valued Representations of Imperfect Information’, International Journal of Approxi-
mate Reasoning, Vol. 86(9), pp 1866-1889.
[2] D. Dubois, H. Prade, P. Smets, (1994), ‘Partial Truth is not Uncertainty: Fuzzy Logic
versus Possibilistic Logic’, IEEE Expert: Intelligent Systems and their Applications,
Vol. 9, No. 4, pp 15-19.
[3] D. Dubois, H. Prade, (1988), Possibility Theory, Plenum Press.
[4] D. Dubois, H. Prade, (2001), ‘Possibility Theory, Probability Theory and Multiple-
valued Logics: A Clariﬁcation’, Annals of Mathematics and Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Vol.
36, pp 35-36.
[5] D. Dubois, (2008), ‘On Ignorance and Contradiction Considered as Truth-values’, Logic
Journal of the IGPL, Vol. 16(2), pp 195-216
[6] H. Field, (2000), ‘Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle’, Nouˆs, Vol.
34, No. 1, pp 1-30.
[7] K. Fine, (1975), ‘Vagueness, Truth and Logic’, Synthese, Vol. 30, pp 265-300.
[8] J-Y. Jaﬀray, (1989), ‘Coherent Bets Under Partially Resolving Uncertainty and Belief
Functions’, Theory and Decision, Vol. 26, pp 99-105.
[9] R. Keefe, P. Smith (Eds.), (2002), Vagueness: A Reader, MIT Press.
[10] S.C. Kleene, (1952), Introduction to Metamathematics, D. Van Nostrand Company
Inc., Princeton, New Jersey.
[11] G. Klir, B, Yuan, (1995), Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic: Theory and Applications,
Prentice Hall.
[12] D. Lassiter, (2011), ‘Vagueness as Probabilistic Linguistic Knowledge’, Lecture Notes
in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Vol. 6517, pp 127-150.
[13] J. Lawry, (2008), ‘Appropriateness Measures: An Uncertainty Model for Vague Con-
cepts’, Synthese, Vol. 161(2), pp 255-269.
[14] J. Lawry, I. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, (2011), ‘A Bipolar Model of Assertabity and Belief’,
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, Vol. 52, pp 76-91.
[15] J. Lawry, Y. Tang, (2012), ‘On Truth-gaps, Bipolar Belief and the Assertability of
Vague Propositions’, Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Vol. 191-192, pp 20-41.
[16] J. Lawry, T.P. Martin, (2013), ‘Conditional Beliefs in a Bipolar Framework, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7958, pp 364-375.
[17] J. Lawry, (2014), ‘Probability, Fuzziness and Borderline Cases, International Journal
of Approximate Reasoning, Vol. 55, pp 1164-1184.
[18] D. Lewis, (1976), ‘Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities’, The
Philosophical Review, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp 297-315.
[19] B. Liu, Y-K. Liu, (2002), ‘Expected Value of Fuzzy Variable and Fuzzy Expected
Value Models’, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp 445-450.
[20] J.  Lukasiewicz, (1920), ‘O logice trojwartosciowej (On three-valued logic).’, Ruch
ﬁlozoﬁczny, Vol. 5, pp 170-171.
[21] D. Mundici, (1995), ‘Averaging the Truth-value in  Lukasiewicz Logic’, Studia Logica,
Vol. 55, No.1, pp 113-127.
[22] D. Mundici, (2006), ‘Bookmaking over Inﬁnite-valued Events’, International Journal
of Approximate Reasoning, Vol. 43, pp 223-240.
[23] C. O’Connor, (2014), ‘The Evolution of Vagueness’, Erkenntnis, Vol. 79(4), pp707-
727.
[24] D. Ripley, (2011), ‘Contradictions at the Borders’, Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, Vol. 6517, pp 169-188.
[25] G. Shafer, (1976), A Mathematical Theory of Evidence.
[26] S. Shapiro, (2006), Vagueness in Context, Oxford University Press.
[27] N.J.J. Smith, (2010), ‘Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value’, in (Eds. R. Dietz,
S. Moruzzi) Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University
Press, pp 491-506.
[28] S. Solt, (2015), ‘Vagueness and Imprecision: Empirical Foundations’, The Annual
Review of Linguistics, Vol. 1, pp 107-127.
[29] J. Robert G. Williams, (2013), ‘Probability and Non-classical Logic’, forthcoming
in (Eds. Hajek and Hitchcock), Oxford Companion to the Philosophy of Probability,
Oxford University Press.
[30] L.A. Zadeh, (1965), ‘Fuzzy Sets’, Information and Control, Vol. 8(3), pp 338-353.
